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Turning from Damage Caps to Information Disclosure:
An Alternative to Tort Reform
Kathryn Zeiler, M.S., J.D., Ph.D.*
With the 2004 U.S. presidential election close at hand, George W.
Bush and his Administration resurrected a previously-killed federal
1
proposal to cap medical malpractice damage awards. The Bush
Administration once again claimed that the United States is experiencing a
medical malpractice insurance crisis and that frivolous medical malpractice
2
lawsuits are the cause of this crisis. According to the current
Administration, large jury awards lead to significant increases in medical
malpractice insurance premiums, driving physicians from the practice of
3
medicine. Indeed, an array of policymakers continue to argue that
* Associate Professor of Law and Co-director of the Law and Economics Workshop
Series at Georgetown University Law Center. The author thanks Victor Fleisher and Mitu
Gulati for helpful comments and Joshua Ellis and Denise Shiu for excellent research
assistance.
1. In March 2003, the House passed the Help Efficient, Accessible, Low Cost, Timely
Healthcare (HEALTH) Act of 2003, H.R. 5, 108th Cong. (2003). The House version of the
proposed legislation caps punitive damages at twice the economic damages or at $250,000,
whichever is greater, and limits attorney’s fees in contingency cases. In July 2003, the
Patients First Act of 2003, S. 11, 108th Cong. (2003) was proposed and defeated. If passed,
the legislation would have placed an award cap of $250,000 on non-economic damages and
limited attorney’s fees in contingency cases.
2. In a recent speech Vice President Richard Cheney argued that
Medical liability litigation is a serious problem in almost every state in the land,
and it’s not getting any better. Frivolous lawsuits are clogging the courts, and
delaying justice for those with real problems. . . . We must protect the rights of
those with real grievances, and we have to fix the medical liability problem at its
source—the frivolous lawsuits that are filed solely with the hope of winning
massive verdicts. That is why President Bush has set forth some responsible,
practical reforms to put doctors and patients back in charge of healthcare in
America . . . . The President has proposed a reasonable federal cap of $250,000
on non-economic damage awards . . . .
Vice President Richard Cheney, Address to Dana Conference Center, Medical College of
Ohio (July 19, 2004), http://www.georgewbush.com/HealthCare/Read.aspx?ID=3006.
3. Id. (quoting Cheney as arguing that “huge payoffs for personal injury trial lawyers”
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damage caps will quell sharply increasing medical malpractice premiums,
despite the fact that empirical evidence regarding the impact of damage
4
caps on premiums is inconclusive.
This Case Study argues that imposing statutory caps on medical
malpractice damages is not an effective method of remedying the medical
malpractice insurance crisis; therefore, policymakers should consider
alternatives to damage caps. In particular, evidence suggests that
implementing mandatory disclosure of the contract terms between
managed care organization (MCOs) and physicians for the provision of
services to enrollees reduces medical malpractice insurance premiums.
Part I of this Case Study reviews the controversy regarding the efficacy
of damage caps in remedying medical malpractice insurance crises and
discusses the state of empirical research investigating the effects of caps.
Part II argues that a particular alternative—forcing disclosure of contract
terms between MCOs and physicians—might more effectively reduce
premiums. Policymakers interested in regulating medical malpractice
insurance premiums should consider implementing MCO-physician
contract disclosure requirements as a means to their desired end.
I. A POPULAR “SOLUTION”: MEDICAL MALPRACTICE DAMAGE CAPS
Several policymakers have proposed imposing medical malpractice
damage caps to solve the current perceived medical malpractice insurance
5
crisis. The proposals have reinvigorated a long-standing debate as to
whether damage caps, in fact, significantly reduce medical malpractice
premiums. Section A provides a short summary of the debate. In Section B,
I discuss an important component of the analysis that has been largely
missing from the debate: the effects of caps on treatment choices. Finally,
in Section C, I briefly analyze the body of empirical research designed to
study the relationship between caps, litigation, and medical malpractice
insurance premiums.

and “massive increases in medical liability insurance premiums, for doctors across the
country” have reached crisis proportions.) In the same address, Cheney claimed that
imposing caps on damages would remedy the problem of increasing medical malpractice
premiums. Id.
4. For a summary of the empirical literature studying the effects of damage caps on
medical malpractice insurance premiums, see Kathryn Zeiler, An Empirical Study of the
Effects of State Regulations on Medical Malpractice Litigation Decisions (July 2004)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
5. See infra Section I.A.
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A. The Controversy over Damage Caps
Politicians and industry players claim that implementing medical
malpractice damage caps will help end the medical malpractice insurance
crisis. Recently, the media reported that “[damage] caps are being pushed
nationally by Republicans including President Bush, who argue that
excessive jury awards are largely responsible for escalating malpractice
6
premiums.” The National Association of Mutual Insurance Companies
(NAIC) supports medical malpractice caps on damages, arguing that caps
7
would limit runaway jury awards of non-economic and punitive damages.
Insurers also argue that caps reduce uncertainty, making it easier for them
8
to set insurance premiums.
On the other hand, opponents of damage caps argue that caps will not
solve the medical malpractice crisis and that the cost of caps outweighs any
9
potential benefits (if, indeed, they create benefits at all). Some
commentators claim that caps are unconstitutional because they infringe
on injured patients’ rights to trials by jury, to open courts, and to equal
10
protection. Others note the potentially perverse effects of damage caps;
for example, some claim that if caps are imposed, fewer legitimate medical
malpractice cases might be filed because the costs of pursuing each claim
11
might exceed expected awarded damages. In addition, empirical
evidence suggests that caps might lead to larger jury awards in some cases
6. John Wagner, Doctors Wooed in Malpractice Insurance Fight, WASH. POST, July 26, 2004,
at B1.
7. Nat’l Ass’n of Mutual Ins. Cos., Medical Malpractice Liability Reform, at
http://www.namic.org/fedkey/04MedMal.asp (last visited Nov. 10, 2004).
8. See W. Kip Viscusi, Tort Reform and Insurance Markets, 7 RISK MGMT. & INS. REV. 9, 20
(2004).
9. See infra notes 10-13 and accompanying text.
10. Ashley Stewart, Note, Texas’ House Bill Four’s Noneconomic Damage Caps Impose the
Burden of Supporting the Medical Industry Solely upon the Most Severely Injured and Therefore Most
in Need of Compensation, 57 SMU L. REV. 497, 503 (2004) (arguing also that damage caps
“cause harm by preventing the most deserving victims from gaining compensation for their
injuries”).
11. See ERIC NORDMAN ET AL., MEDICAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE REPORT: A STUDY OF
MARKET CONDITIONS AND POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS TO THE RECENT CRISIS 47 (2004),
http://www.naic.org/models_papers/papers/MMP-OP-04-EL.pdf (draft report presented
to the NAIC’s Property and Casualty Committee July 14, 2004) (arguing that “[s]ince the
costs of researching and arguing a medical malpractice case can be very large, awards
available once caps are introduced may not, in some cases, cover even the costs associated
with pursuing a claim.”); see also Rachel Zimmerman, As Malpractice Caps Spread, Lawyers
Turn Away Some Cases, WALL ST. J., Oct. 8, 2004, at A1.
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because jurors might perceive the cap as the correct amount to award to all
12
injured plaintiffs. Similar perceptions by negotiating parties can also skew
13
settlement outcomes in unexpected ways.
Importantly, neither proponents nor opponents of caps have
considered how caps might affect treatment choices made by physicians
and managed care organizations and how these choices influence patient
injury rates. In the following Section, I extend the boundaries of the
debate by arguing that caps, at least theoretically, affect treatment choices,
which in turn impact injury rates and medical malpractice claim rates.
B. The Missing Component: The Influence of Damage Caps on Treatment Choices

14

While proponents of damage caps frequently argue that excessive
15
litigation increases the practice of defensive medicine by physicians,
critics of caps might similarly assert that limits on damages may also
16
adversely affect treatment decisions. An examination of how caps
influence the behavior of a wider array of health care market actors reveals
that they can produce perverse incentives at the treatment decision stage.

12. See Jennifer K. Robbennolt & Christina A. Studebaker, Anchoring in the Courtroom:
The Effects of Caps on Punitive Damages, 23 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 353 (1999). Of course, these
results might be important only in regimes in which juries are informed of statutory
damage caps prior to deliberating about damages. Currently, only courts in Massachusetts
are required to instruct the jury that, if it finds the defendant liable, it may not (in most
cases) award more than the statutory limit for non-economic damages. See MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 231, § 60H (West Supp. 1995). West Virginia allows the court to instruct the jury
in this manner. See W. VA. CODE § 55-7B-8 (1994).
13. See Greg Pogarsky & Linda Babcock, Damage Caps, Motivated Anchoring, and
Bargaining Impasse, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 143 (2001).
14. For a complete analysis of the effects of damage caps on treatment choices, see
Zeiler, supra note 4 (presenting theoretical predictions regarding how damage caps affect
medical malpractice claim rates).
15. See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CONFRONTING THE NEW HEALTH CARE
CRISIS: IMPROVING HEALTH CARE QUALITY AND LOWERING COSTS BY FIXING OUR MEDICAL
LIABILITY SYSTEM 19 (July 2002) (arguing that “[t]he excesses of the litigation system are an
important contributor to ‘defensive medicine’”). Defensive medicine refers to the practice
of providing patients with an inefficient amount of medical care to avoid exposure to
liability for medical practice. For example, a physician might order an excessive number of
diagnostic tests to be sure that she meets the legal standard of care when treating a
particular patient. For a discussion of defensive medicine, see CHARLES E. PHELPS, HEALTH
ECONOMICS 442-45 (3d ed. 2003).
16. To the best of my knowledge, this has not been argued in the past by those who
oppose caps on damages.
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Consider, first, how damage caps might influence the decision of an
injured patient (or her attorney who likely is employed by the patient on a
contingency-fee basis) regarding whether to file a medical malpractice
claim against her physician. Assume that a patient will file a claim only if
17
expected damages exceed litigation costs. Estimates of expected damages
depend on two variables: the anticipated damage award and the
probability that the patient will succeed in recovering this amount from
the physician. The probability of success (whether by court award or
through settlement), in turn, depends on the likelihood that the physician
provided non-compliant medical care. All other things being equal, as the
likelihood that the physician provided non-compliant treatment increases,
the probability of recovering damages increases, as does the probability
18
that an injured patient will file a claim.
The next step in the analysis is to consider how caps affect the
probability that a physician will provide non-compliant treatment. In
theory, when deciding whether to provide costly compliant treatment, the
physician (in conjunction with the patient’s MCO) weighs the costs and
19
the benefits of providing such care. Costs refer to all the expenses
incurred in providing compliant care; the benefits include the reduction
in exposure to liability for medical malpractice. Damage caps reduce the
exposure to liability; therefore, the imposition of caps makes it optimal, in
some cases, for physicians (or MCOs) to face potential liability for medical
malpractice rather than provide costly treatment that complies with the
legal standard of care. Recent research does, in fact, indicate that

17. In other words, assume injured patients act perfectly rationally when deciding
whether to sue for medical malpractice. Of course, in some cases, these decisions may be
driven by factors other than the expected monetary costs and benefits of filing a claim (e.g.,
emotions, revenge and strategic behavior). However, since patients must convince lawyers
to take on these cases in exchange for a cut of the pie, it is unlikely that filing decisions are
driven significantly by emotional factors. In addition, physicians tend not to cave easily to
patients’ demands based on nonmeritorious claims because they highly value their
reputations (and would risk sanctions). See Linda Oberman, IG Asks Why More Hospitals Don’t
Report Adverse Actions, AM. MED. NEWS, Feb. 13, 1995, at 4 (claiming that reputation effects,
in part, drive physician reluctance to settle medical malpractice cases).
18. To obtain this result we need only assume that the court is better at verifying
whether the physician provided negligent treatment than it would be if it flipped a fair coin.
This assumption does not seem unreasonable.
19. For a detailed analysis of the physician’s treatment choice, see Kathryn Zeiler,
Medical Malpractice and Contract Disclosure: An Equilibrium Model of the Effects of Legal
Rules on Behavior in Health Care Markets 16-18 (Apr. 2004) (unpublished manuscript, on
file with author).
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physicians react to different sorts of financial incentives in this way.
To summarize, if damage caps reduce exposure to liability, physicians
(and MCOs), on average, may be less likely to provide compliant
treatment. This will result in an increase in patient injuries, and in turn, an
increase in the number of injured patients who file claims for medical
21
malpractice.
This increase in the claims rate, coupled with the potential decrease in
the average damage award (and settlements) due to the cap, is likely to
yield indeterminacy: Because of these competing forces the influence of
caps on ex ante calculations of expected damages from medical
malpractice claims (and therefore medical malpractice insurance
premiums) will depend on other variables, such as the cost of treatment
relative to expected damages, the probabilities of injuries given compliant
22
and non-compliant treatment, and the amount of the cap. Therefore, the
claim that caps will decrease medical malpractice insurance premiums is
arguably shortsighted because it does not account for the influence of caps
on influence treatment choices.
20. While the effects of tort reform on treatment choices have not been studied
empirically to date, some have investigated the effects of financial incentives on treatment
choices and find that physicians do respond to financial incentives. See, e.g., Thomas S.
Crane, The Problem of Physician Self-Referral Under the Medicare and Medicaid Antikickback Statute,
268 JAMA 85, 86 (1992) (citing government studies indicating that physicians respond to
financial incentives in their treatment practices); David Hemenway et al., Physicians’
Responses to Financial Incentives: Evidence from a For-Profit Ambulatory Care Center, 322 NEW ENG.
J. MED. 1059, 1062 (1990) (showing that physicians react to bonus arrangements that reward
them for ordering laboratory tests by significantly increasing the number of tests they
order). In addition, studies have found that physicians who report that their contracts with
MCOs include incentives to reduce referrals were “more likely than others to have felt
pressure to limit referrals in a manner that compromised care.” See Kevin Grumbach et al.,
Primary Care Physicians’ Experience of Financial Incentives in Managed-Care Systems, 339 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 1516 (1998).
21. It is important to note that physician exposure to liability likely will influence MCO
behavior. If the costs of practicing medicine increase due to increased exposure liability,
then physicians will demand more in compensation from MCOs. MCOs can influence
physician treatment choices directly by approving or denying reimbursement for treatments
and indirectly through financial incentives written into MCO-physician contracts.
Therefore, changes in physicians’ exposure to liability will influence MCO-physician
contracts and MCO decisions regarding whether to approve particular treatments.
22. See Zeiler, supra note 4, for a complete characterization of the equilibria under
various conditions. Despite the indeterminacy, “unless the cap is so restrictive that total
damages fall below litigation costs, caps are likely to cause an increase in ex ante expected
damages.” Id. at 13.
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With a more complete understanding of how damage caps might
influence the choices of health care market actors, we are positioned to
evaluate the empirical results, produced using field data, to study the
effects of caps on medical malpractice insurance and litigation behavior.
The following Section summarizes the state of the empirical literature and
argues that the cumulative findings do not allow us to draw conclusions
regarding how damage caps influence medical malpractice insurance
markets or litigation behavior.
C. Empirical Evidence
Several researchers have employed field data to investigate whether
caps significantly influence medical malpractice insurance premiums and
23
losses incurred by insurers. A review of this empirical literature reveals
two general themes. First, the empirical results generally are mixed.
Second, given the difficulties in directly measuring the influence of caps,
reliance on the results of most studies is controversial.
Results vary significantly depending on the data employed, the
specifications of the empirical models, and the time periods studied. For
example, Professor Frank Sloan investigated the influence of damage caps
24
on premiums paid by physicians in three specific fields. The study
incorporated data for the years 1974-1978. Using regression analysis, he
found that damage caps significantly affected neither premiums nor
annual percentage change in premiums for any of the three fields tested.
Professor Kip Viscusi and his colleagues focused mainly on the effects of
the second generation of tort reforms to be implemented by state
25
legislators. Using 1988 aggregated premiums by state, they considered the
change in premiums from 1985 to 1987. The analysis controlled for
differences in state regulation of insurers. The authors considered limits
on non-economic damages and limits on punitive damages and, like Frank,
found that limits on non-economic damages did not significantly affect
premiums.
Conversely, Stephen Zuckerman of the Urban Institute and his
23. See Zeiler, supra note 4 (reviewing the empirical literature).
24. Frank A. Sloan, State Responses to the Malpractice Insurance “Crisis” of the 1970s: An
Empirical Assessment, 9 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 629, 637-643 (1985).
25. See, e.g., W. K. Viscusi et al., The Effect of 1980s Tort Reform Legislation on General
Liability and Medical Malpractice Insurance, 6 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 165, 186 (1993)
(analyzing the effects of reforms such as modifications of joint and several liability, limits on
liability and establishments of immunities, limits on noneconomic and punitive damages
and provisions for structured and periodic payments of damage awards).

391

385 CS_ZEILER_V2

12/29/2004 10:28 PM

YALE JOURNAL OF HEALTH POLICY, LAW, AND ETHICS

V:1 (2005)

colleagues found that damage caps significantly reduced medical
26
malpractice insurance premiums. The study uses data covering a thirteenyear period—1974 through 1986—and including data for most states.
Likewise, Professor Vasanthakumar Bhat examined the influence of
damage caps on several indicators including claim rates, severity of claims,
27
and premiums. Using data on the payment rate per physician of each
state for the period 1991-1995, Bhat found that caps on economic and
non-economic damages, taken together, significantly decreased premiums.
However, similar to the results of some others, Bhat found that caps on
non-economic damages, considered alone, had no effect on premium
levels.
These mixed empirical results are most likely due to the difficulties in
measuring the influence of caps on medical malpractice insurance and
28
litigation. These difficulties arise for a variety of reasons. First, isolating
the effects of caps in the presence of other sorts of tort reform is
complicated. Second, the uncertainty generated by legal challenges
claiming, for example, that reforms are unconstitutional makes it difficult
29
to measure the direct effect of caps on insurance and litigation. Third,
the availability of data is limited and the data that is available presents
challenges in the design of empirical studies. For instance, data on actual
losses paid aggregated by state are generally unavailable, although some
30
researchers have obtained data of this sort directly from insurers.
Furthermore, using proxies for losses paid (e.g., losses incurred) presents
additional concerns, including the danger that accounting adjustments
might substantially reduce the correlation between losses paid and the
31
proxy. Specifically, the managers of insurance companies have incentives

26. Stephen Zuckerman et al., Effects of Tort Reforms and Other Factors on Medical
Malpractice Insurance Premiums, 27 INQUIRY 167 (1990).
27. VASANTHAKUMAR N. BHAT, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: A COMPREHENSIVE ANALYSIS
(2001).
28. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE EFFECTS OF TORT REFORM: EVIDENCE FROM THE STATES
(June 2004) (discussing the difficulties in evaluating the results of the empirical studies on
the factors discussed in this Section of the Case Study).
29. See Heidi Li Feldman, Harm and Money: Against the Insurance Theory of Tort
Compensation, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1567, 1568 n.4 (1997) (discussing cases in which tort reforms
have been held unconstitutional on theories of violation of equal protection, violation of
right to court access and violations of rights to due process).
30. See Albert Yoon, Damage Caps and Civil Litigation: An Empirical Study of Medical
Malpractice Litigation in the South, 3 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 199, 209 (2001).
31. See Zeiler, supra note 4 (analyzing data on losses incurred gathered by the National
Association of Insurance Commissioners). Of 550 observations of state-level losses incurred
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to manipulate the reserves to manage the bottom lines of their companies.
Thus, if we observe lower incurred losses in regimes which cap damages,
this may not reflect the true effects of the caps, but rather the effects of
earnings manipulations that might be unrelated to manager expectations
regarding future losses. In fact, managers might use the fact that damage
caps are in place to justify decreasing reserves. Finally, as cogently
explained by Professor Albert Yoon, employing simple regressions to study
the effects of damage caps on medical malpractice insurance premiums
can be problematic if the implementation of caps is endogenous to
perceived market conditions related to premiums. In other words, if caps
are implemented in response to rising medical malpractice insurance
premiums, then it becomes difficult to measure the influence of the caps
32
33
on premiums. This problem is referred to as endogeneity
In a recent study, Yoon demonstrated empirical modeling techniques
34
that can be used in the face of potential endogeneity. By using a
difference-in-difference approach, Yoon was able to account for conditions
present before and after the implementation and repeal of damage caps.
Employing this technique and others to control for various additional
modeling concerns, Yoon found that caps decreased the average relative
recovery by medical malpractice claimants. This study offers an important
step toward determining the actual effects of caps on insurance and
litigation. The results, however, do not allow us to make claims about
whether total losses paid out to claimants increase or decrease when caps
are imposed because the results do not provide insights into how caps

(fifty states over eleven years), thirteen observations are negative. Id. This suggests that
adjustments to reserves might swamp losses incurred and reduce the correlation between
losses incurred and losses paid. See also Patient Access Crisis: The Role of Medical Litigation,
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 2-3 (2003) (statement of Jay Angoff, Counsel,
Roger G. Brown & Associates) (reporting testimony describing insurance company
manager incentives to inflate or understate estimates of losses incurred).
32. See Yoon, supra note 30, at 202 (arguing that if “the policy is a codification of
underlying conditions . . . that actually caused the policy to be implemented in the first
place,” then determining the causal connection between the implementation of caps and
indicators, such as losses, becomes difficult).
33. For an explanation of the problems resulting from endogeneity, see STEPHEN J.
SCHMIDT, ECONOMETRICS 263-81 (2004). See also HOWELL E. JACKSON ET AL., ANALYTICAL
METHODS FOR LAWYERS 565-566 (2003) (illustrating endogeneity, which they refer to as “twoway causation,” by pointing out that it is difficult to understand the influence of increasing
the number of police on crime rates because more police tend to be sent to particular
areas: namely, those with high crime rates).
34. See Yoon, supra note 32, at 203.
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influence the number of patient injuries and the number of claims filed. If
caps result in an increase in the number of claims filed, then despite the
fact that average recoveries decrease, caps could increase the total losses
paid.
Despite the fervent push to implement damage caps as a solution to
35
the medical malpractice insurance crisis, more research clearly is needed
to determine how caps and other sorts of tort reform actually affect
behavior in health care markets. Not only is more empirical research
necessary, but also it is important that the empirical research be grounded
in sound theoretical models of the effects of tort reform on behavior in
health care markets. In the meantime, turning our attention to other
possible remedies might prove useful. Part II presents an alternative
remedy yet to be addressed by policymakers.
II. AN ALTERNATIVE REMEDY: MANDATORY CONTRACT DISCLOSURE
As of 2001, twenty-one states required MCOs to disclose to their
enrollees or prospective enrollees the terms of their contracts with
36
physicians. While the goal of forcing contract disclosure is simply to
provide information to consumers during the health plan selection
37
process, evidence suggests that disclosure of contract terms might result
in lower medical malpractice insurance premiums.
The relationship between contract disclosure and medical malpractice
insurance premiums is not intuitive. To understand the relationship, one
must consider how the revelation of MCO-physician contract terms
influences two types of decisions: litigation decisions made by injured
38
patients and contract decisions made by MCOs.
First, consider how contract disclosures affect whether an injured
patient pursues a medical malpractice claim against her physician. As
discussed above, patients considering whether to file a medical malpractice
35. See supra Section I.A.
36. For a list of states that force disclosure of contracts between MCOs and physicians,
see Zeiler, supra note 4.
37. Cf. William M. Sage, Regulating Through Information: Disclosure Laws and American
Health Care, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1701, 1825 (1999).
38. For a more complete game-theoretic analysis of the influence of mandatory contract
disclosure rules on MCO-physician contracts, compliant treatment rates and medical
malpractice litigation rates, see Zeiler, supra note 19; see also, Kathryn Zeiler, Medical
Malpractice and Contract Disclosure: An Equilibrium Model of the Effects of Legal Rules
on Behavior in Health Care Markets (Apr. 2004) (Working Paper presented to the Am. L. &
Econ. Ass’n Annual Meeting, 2004).
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claim frequently must do so under conditions of imperfect information.
The injured patient is not always able to observe whether her injury was
39
truly caused by negligent behavior on the part of her physician. Injured
patients (and their attorneys) benefit from information that helps to
40
resolve this uncertainty when deciding whether to pursue costly litigation.
MCO-physician contract terms are just this sort of information. In
theory, injured patients should be able to update their prior beliefs about
whether the physician acted negligently by considering the contract terms.
For example, if the patient observes that the MCO and the physician
agreed to a traditional fee-for-service arrangement (i.e., the physician is
reimbursed a fee by the MCO for each particular medical service
provided), then the injured patient might be more likely to believe that
expensive compliant treatment was provided than if the MCO and
physician agreed to a capitated arrangement (i.e., the MCO pays the
physician a fixed dollar amount per patient per month and the physician
41
pays for overruns out of his own pocket).
Still, how does a change in the way potential litigants make decisions
about whether to file claims lead to lower medical malpractice insurance
premiums? The next step in the analysis is to consider how behavior at the
litigation stage affects contract choices. MCOs design physician contracts
to provide incentives for physicians to choose treatments that maximize
MCO profits. In regimes that force contract disclosure, MCOs must
consider not only how the contract terms shape physician treatment
decisions, but also how the contract terms will influence litigation
decisions by injured patients. By observing disclosed contract terms,
patients are able to update their beliefs about the likelihood that they

39. Whether the patient is able to infer that the injury was caused by the negligent
actions of the physician or MCO depends on two probabilities: the probability that nonnegligent treatment results in injury and the probability that negligent treatment results in
injury. If these probabilities fall somewhere between zero and one, but are not equal to zero
or one, then the patient will be uncertain about whether the injury resulted from negligent
treatment. These probabilities, of course, will differ from case to case and will depend on
the nature of the treatment, the characteristics of the patient and other such factors. See
Zeiler, supra note 14.
40. This general concept is not novel: When principals are not able to observe behavior,
they often turn to other sources of information, such as the number of hours the agent
worked or whether the agent seemed intoxicated. See EDWARD P. LAZEAR, PERSONNEL
ECONOMICS (1995).
41. See Zeiler, supra note 19, at 21-29 (predicting the manner in which MCOs will
employ various contract types to influence physician behavior given a particular legal
regime).
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received compliant treatment. In fact, MCOs benefit from disclosing
because they can use disclosures to signal the provision of compliant
42
treatment and potentially reduce the number of claims filed. In other
words, when injured patients receive the signal that compliant treatment
was provided, they are less likely to file a costly medical malpractice claim
because the likelihood of succeeding is low. Therefore, when patients can
observe contract terms it is more likely that the MCO, when comparing the
cost of compliant treatment to the expected damage award, will find it
optimal to employ particular contract terms to encourage the physician to
provide compliant treatment. This is because, in those cases, the cost of
providing the level of compliant treatment necessary to ensure that very
few medical malpractice claims are filed is less than the reduction in
exposure to liability that results from the increase in the provision of
43
compliant treatment.
As a result, in regimes that mandate contract
disclosure, MCOs are more likely to use contract terms that encourage
physicians to provide compliant treatment and patients are less likely to file
44
medical malpractice claims.
Initial empirical tests of the theoretical predictions regarding how
mandatory contract disclosure rules affect medical malpractice insurance
premiums support claims that disclosure rules decrease ex ante expected
damages arising from medical malpractice claims. A study using data on
medical malpractice insurance premiums per physician in the fifty U.S.

42. That we do not observe MCOs voluntarily disclosing physician contract terms is
most likely due to the fact that disclosure of this information is costly. Not only is the
disclosure itself costly to produce, but an MCO might lose its competitive advantage if it
discloses information about innovative contract terms that create efficiencies not enjoyed by
competing MCOs. See Zeiler, supra note 4, at 28-29. In addition, that we do not observe
consumers demanding disclosure of contractual arrangements might be due to market
failures. See Bruce C. Greenwald & Joseph E. Stiglitz, Externalities in Economies with Imperfect
Information and Incomplete Markets, 101 Q. J. ECON. 229 (1986). Market failures abound in
health care insurance markets. In particular, given that a substantial number of consumers
obtain their health insurance through their employers, most consumers of health insurance
are not involved in the bargaining process. See KAISER FAMILY FOUND., EMPLOYER HEALTH
BENEFITS 2004 ANNUAL SURVEY (2004), http://www.kff.org/insurance/7148/summary/
index.cfm (reporting that “[e]mployer-sponsored health insurance reaches more than
three out of every five nonelderly Americans”). In addition, employers’ interests are not
necessarily aligned with the interests of their employees.
43. See Zeiler, supra note 19, at 21-31 for a detailed explanation of this result.
44. For a complete analysis of how mandatory contract disclosure rules lead to more
compliant treatment and less litigation, see Zeiler, supra note 19, at 29-31 for a detailed
explanation of this result.
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states for the period 1991-2001 provides some support for the prediction
that mandatory disclosure rules decrease ex ante expected damages from
45
medical malpractice claims. The empirical results indicate that medical
malpractice insurance premiums are lower in states that force disclosure of
contract terms.
Mandatory disclosure has some potential drawbacks as well. For
example, by forcing MCOs to disclose information about physician
46
contracts they are, in essence, forced to reveal trade secrets. Innovative
physician contracts arguably afford MCOs the opportunity to obtain an
advantage over competitors. This benefit provides an incentive for MCOs
to design creative, efficient physician contracts, an endeavor advantageous
not only for the MCO but also for enrollees who enjoy lower prices and/or
higher quality. Forcing MCOs to disclose information about these
contracts might diminish the incentive to expend resources to develop
innovative physician contracts. It is important to weigh these disadvantages
against the benefits gained or consider ways to work around them before
implementing such policies.
CONCLUSION
This Case Study focuses on the “best way” to address or improve the
current state of malpractice insurance. Given the complexity of the
industry, the solution likely will be complex itself, as it must address
45. See Zeiler, supra note 4, at 19-22, 24-26 (reporting regression results indicating that,
under reasonable specifications, mandatory contract disclosure leads to lower medical
malpractice insurance premiums). The effect of mandatory disclosure rules, however,
becomes statistically insignificant when assuming (1) that a lag exists between the time
statutes are passed and insurance rates reflect the new rule and (2) that current year
premiums depend on prior year premiums. Id. At 24-26. While these empirical results
provide some support for the theoretical prediction that mandatory disclosure rules lead to
lower medical malpractice insurance premiums, it is important to note that these are
preliminary findings. Further investigation is required before we can recommend policy
prescriptions.
46. HMOs have argued that required disclosure of physician contracts is unfair because
the contracts are trade secrets. They claim that contracts are the result of much time and
effort spent negotiating with physicians, and forced disclosure will allow competitors to
unfairly take advantage of the end product without contributing to the costs. See
Wilmington Star-News v. New Hanover Reg’l Med. Ctr., 480 S.E.2d 53, 56 (N.C. Ct. App.
1997) (discussing whether pricing information in HMO contracts constitutes a trade
secret). Forcing disclosure of physician incentives might create an economic disincentive to
expend resources constructing innovative incentive arrangements. It is important to
consider this when evaluating whether mandatory disclosure is socially optimal.
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information asymmetries, agency problems, the negative effects of adverse
selection, and various other market imperfections resulting from the
structure of health care markets. Likely, no one remedy will be a panacea.
In addition, seemingly intuitive remedies often produce unintended,
perverse effects.
The main point of this Case Study is to argue that damage caps, while
a seemingly intuitive fix, might not be the cure-all touted by politicians and
industry actors. Deeper analyses of the effects of caps reveal that they
might affect health care markets in ways that make matters worse. In
addition, given the nature of the inquiry and inherent methodological
problems, we cannot draw strong conclusions from the body of empirical
studies that investigate the effect of caps on medical malpractice insurance
premiums.
Given these difficulties, we should focus on alternatives to damage
caps. One such alternative—mandating disclosure of MCO-physician
contract terms—appears promising. An analysis considering how the
market will react to the mandate indicates that forcing disclosure will lead
to lower medical malpractice insurance premiums. Preliminary empirical
evidence suggests that it is worthwhile to explore this remedy further.
Patchwork remedies and politically-driven policies likely will not
ameliorate the negative consequences of health care market imperfections.
If we have any hope of structuring and regulating health care markets so as
to reduce the probability of experiencing various sorts of crises, we must
step back and take a comprehensive look at how market actors will adjust
to regulations and how various regulations interact with one another.
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